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 In Fall 2010 Stanley McChrystal delivered a speech at California Polytechnic State University 
where he described the following: “I want you to picture the aftermath of a fatal plane crash. Now 
think of a field, strewn with wreckage. The presence of emergency vehicles, police tape, emergency 
workers, and there's an unmistakable sense of tragedy and loss and failure. Typically, an investigation 
is conducted to determine the cause of the accident and the conclusion is often that the pilot 
experienced something called vertigo, a sense of confusion and loss of spacial awareness. It causes an 
otherwise proficient pilot to make decisions and manipulate the flight controls in ways inappropriate 
for the situation; what happens is the pilot literally flies the aircraft into the ground. Now, let me get 
you to put another image in your mind. It’s a school, in eastern Afghanistan, in Kunar province, in the 
district of Kamdesh; it’s a mountainous, difficult region. The new school building is badly damaged and 
there are no teachers, no students, and smoke still lingers from the fire. Predictably, coalition forces 
investigate who attacked the brand new school and why they would do that. And they discover that a 
school was requested by two villages both from the same tribe, about three kilometers apart. Someone 
who was an efficiency expert picked a spot one point five kilometers equidistant from each of those, and 
there they built a school. And it was attacked by the villagers themselves. And the villagers resented the 
fact that this was perceived as an effort to make the students, the children of the two different villages, 
go to school together. Though all the people had the same tribal background, they hated each other. 
And that hatred only went back about one hundred years. And when the school was built, instead of 
hiring locals who needed employment, an outside element was brought in to construct the school. So 
what happened was, well-intentioned actions by coalition forces not only failed to solve the problem, to 
provide education, we created a new one by taking an incorrect action due to misunderstanding. It 
sounds an awful lot like vertigo. We flew the school into the ground. Vertigo is a deadly phenomenon. 
It’s also fascinating as a well-intentioned and otherwise intelligent individual takes an incorrect action 
based upon a misunderstanding of the situation, and the outcome is tragic.” 
 ~ General  Stanley McChrystal (Ret.) 
 
 
 In a prophetic article, Yale Law School professor Bruce Ackerman in 2009 commented on 
General Stanley McChrystal’s controversial comments made in London. McChrystal noted that Vice 
President Biden’s Afghanistan strategy would lead to “Chaos-istan” (Burns). Ackerman reported, 
“McChrystal was almost cavalier in dismissing this point. After praising his superiors for encouraging 
straight talk, he laughingly suggested that ‘they may change their minds and crush me some day.” 
McChrystal was relieved of command less than a year later and is now a “senior fellow with the 
Jackson Institute for Global Affairs” at Yale (Drake). 
On June 22nd General of the Army Stanley McChrystal was quoted in a Rolling Stone article 
  
as having said, “How'd I get screwed into going to this dinner?” “The dinner comes with the position, 
sir,” replied his chief of staff, Col. Charlie Flynn. McChrystal turned sharply in his chair. “Hey, 
Charlie,” he asked, “does this come with the position?” McChrystal gives him the middle finger” 
(Hastings 92). McChrystal's published comments and opinions were embarrassing, unbecoming, and 
understood as an act of blatant insubordination against his Commander in Chief. “Officials who 
participated in the discussions say no single passage was fatal to McChrystal, but ‘the opening was 
really bad’ (Allen). The outcry that rose up against Stanley McChrystal was both unified and clear: 
“McChrystal should be dismissed, dismissed immediately, and unceremoniously returned home” 
(Wong). Following the uproar, President Barack Obama acted decidedly. After calling Stanley 
McChrystal back to Washington and a brief private meeting, McChrystal turned in his resignation.  
This incident between McChrystal and Obama was not the first time something like this has 
happened. As James L. Golden noted in his work, Towards a Meaning-Centered Theory of Rhetoric, 
“As humans, happenings in the past give our responses their character of meaning” (174). This event 
was heavily interpreted with the past in mind. The clash between president and general marked another 
historic episode of military-civilian eruptions, the most famous of which was between Douglas 
MacArthur and Harry Truman (Duffy & Carpenter). General Stanley McChrystal's comments and 
actions depicted in Rolling Stone's “The Runaway General” were given their character of meaning in 
light of Douglas MacArthur’s insubordinate actions half a century before him. Similarly, Barack 
Obama's acceptance of McChrystal's resignation, was interpreted in the same manner as Harry 
Truman's a half a century earlier. McChrystal's actions might not have caught as much attention if 
Douglass MacArthur decades before had MacArthur not challenged Harry Truman. Because 
MacArthur was insubordinate in speaking out and Truman fired him, Obama could do the same with 
McChrystal. If Truman had not exerted his constitutional powers so many years ago, then the choice 
before Barack Obama might not have been as clear. It was no coincidence then, when Obama evoked 
  
the memory of the Truman MacArthur conflict, in his speech noting McChrystal’s removal from 
command. He said, “our democracy depends upon institutions that are stronger than individuals. That 
includes strict adherence to the military chain of command and respect for civilian control over that 
chain of command” (Obama). 
The Historical Critical Approach 
The goal of this study is accurately reflected in I. A. Richards assertion of rhetoric’s purpose: 
“Rhetoric, I shall argue, should be a study of misunderstanding and its remedies. We struggle all our 
days with misunderstandings and no apology is required for any study which can prevent or remove 
them” (Richards 3). Misunderstandings surrounding Stanley McChrystal's insubordination require a 
candid look into the rhetoric, key actors, and events with the goal of debunking probability from 
possibility, and perception from reality. In a similar vein to Gordon Mitchell's, “Team B Intelligence 
Coups,” I will examine the events surrounding McChrystal's resignation and strive to refute commonly 
held public assumptions including those described by Michael Hastings in “The Runaway General.” 
Mitchell’s explains: “This upstream focus on the communication practices responsible for generating 
flawed intelligence stands to complement rhetorical studies that explain downstream dynamics of how 
official speeches and media coverage framed popular understanding of the intelligence once it began 
circulating in channels of public deliberation” (147). Michael Hastings’ portrayal of McChrystal 
filtered and sent “flawed intelligence” downstream, which explains how “official speeches and media 
coverage framed popular understanding” of the event once it was published. Barack Obama and his 
cabinet reacted and made decisions based on a biased source. To a large extent, “The Runaway 
General” is a representation of many Americans’ commonly held understanding of the war in 
Afghanistan and is the primary focus of this study. McChrystal's actions, his interpretation of 
Afghanistan, and his reasons for insubordination are prime grounds for clarification.  
 The comments made by McChrystal's aides led to an eruption of criticism in the White House. 
  
In response to McChrystal, the President had to choose what should be done with the General.  How 
should it be publicly explained? What was the best way to justify the decision? McChrystal's rhetoric 
and his actions drew attention to President Obama's choice of words and style of persuasion. According 
to Washington Post: “In the resolution of the MacArthur showdown, the country learned a lot about 
Harry Truman. Whether General McChrystal stays or goes for what he said to Rolling Stone … the 
nation is likely to learn a lot about Barack Obama” (Sanger). The very nature and character of ideas in 
transmission is dependent upon configurations of language. The interpretation of a speech calls for a 
more complete understanding of what goes into a speech, the purpose of the speech and the interplay of 
factors which comprise the public speaking situation, of nuances of meaning which emerge only from 
the reading of a speech in the light of its setting.” (Scott, 107). Obama's “Remarks on McChrystal” 
were part of the “interplay of factors” that was caused by the Rolling Stone’s publication. The remarks 
provide a better understanding of the “nuance of meaning.” 
Precedence and the President 
Obama spoke to stop the damaging fallout from his hand-picked General who, after only one 
year, had twice made public remarks against him (Burns).  Obama justified his Constitutional authority 
over the military, cited the responsibility he bore, and affirmed his decision for relieving the 
insubordinate General. Using the Constitution as his supporting argument, Barack Obama’s acceptance 
of  McChrystal’s resignation was based not only on it but also on direct and indirect use of precedence. 
Obama drew heavily from Harry Truman’s example (Schweid). Despite being orators with very 
different speaking styles, Truman being direct, brief and blunt, Obama being eloquent, well versed and 
suave; Obama's remarks have a strong number of persuasive appeals similar to those used by Truman. 
Truman was a natural orator while Obama who in nature and education is among the ranks of 
America’s most eloquent leaders (White 38). Obama relied upon Truman's structural use of evidence  
in his speech through repetition of words, Constitutional authority, and force of language, “We are 
  
going to break the Taliban's momentum. We are going to build Afghan capacity. We are going to 
relentlessly apply pressure on Al Qaida and its leadership...” Also he praises the newly-appointed 
general, “General Petraeus fully participated in our review last fall, and he both supported and helped 
design the strategy that we have in place” (Obama). He then turns his remarks to the resigning general: 
 “He [McChrystal] has earned a reputation as one of our nation’s finest soldiers.” In expressing regret 
over the old Generals departure, Obama says,  “I did so (fired Stanley McChrystal) with considerable 
regret.” Obama justifies his authority based on the Constitution with, “the reasons that led me to this 
decision are the same principles that have supported the strength of our military and our nation since 
the founding” (Obama).  Each one of these elements is a near mirror of what Truman said when he 
fired Douglas MacArthur (Duffy, Warrior). 
 With precedence in mind, a question arises about why the President did not take a more direct, 
two-sided argumentative stance against the damning claims made in Rolling Stone article? Though 
Obama's speech is more eloquent, Truman is quoted at several key junctures.  His lack of examples and 
contextual rebuttals is unlike Harry Truman's speech which has held up under historical scrutiny. 
Obama's deviates argumentatively. According to Daniel O'Keefe, “Specifically, refutational two-sided 
messages are dependably more persuasive than one-sided messages; non-refutational two-sided 
messages, on the other hand, are significantly less persuasive than their one-sided counterparts” (221). 
O’Keefe summarizes by saying “Persuaders are best advised to meet opposing arguments head on, by 
refuting them, rather than ignoring or (worse still) merely mentioning such counterarguments” 
(O’Keefe 220-21). The President might have been advised to avoid issues which could evoke policy 
feuds and instead establish an idealized future of success and achievement. That being said, Obama's 
remarks were too narrow in focus. Obama had the freedom to refute and address his General's 
insubordinate claims made in Rolling Stone, yet he did not. His audience was wider than the American 
public and extended to Karzai as well as other allies in Afghanistan. The arguments made in Rolling 
  
Stone were left completely unaddressed. McChrystal, Obama, and the Constitution were the focus of 
Obama's remarks, not the Rolling Stone or counter arguments. 
According to Ronald Carpenter in Rhetoric in Martial Deliberations and Decision Making, 
“The rhetorical skills that lead to persuasion in the past are the same that will work (or fail) in the 
present” (Carpenter viii). Regardless of the success or failure of Obama’s speech, one must consider the 
equally important artifact, “The Runaway General,” which sparked the conflict with McChrystal in the 
first place. If there had been no text, there would have been no speech. McChrystal’s behavior was 
interpreted within the context of previous historical conflicts. With the past in mind, was McChrystal in  
fact insubordinate, just a bad communicator caught off guard, or was there another less obvious force at 
work? 
Courage and Caution 
“Officers must understand their audience and offer them good reason to believe that his or 
her proposed course of action not only will work, but will do so better than any other.” and “the 
serving military commander, in proposing action for the greatest success must prudently balance 
‘caution and courage.’” 
~ Rhetoric in Martial Deliberations viii, ix 
 Whatever McChrystal's attempts at balancing “caution and courage” were, they evidently were 
not successful. After having been head commander in Afghanistan for only a year, McChrystal had 
“managed to piss off almost everyone with a stake in the conflict” (Duffy, “Examplars”). Even after 
being reprimanded for speaking out in London, McChrystal appeared still not to understand, or 
purposefully disregarded his superiors wishes that he keep his mouth shut (Hastings, “Runaway 
General”). Why did General Stanley McChrystal, after thirty-four years of being an army officer, step 
so far out of line as to ridicule his President? (McChrystal, “Retirement”). By all accounts a brilliant 
man, McChrystal's actions come off as strikingly naive and insubordinate for such a high ranking 
  
commander. By his own acknowledgement and that of Robert Gates, McChrystal admits that he might 
be ironically “a modern Patton of strategic communications,” which is no compliment (McChrystal, 
“Retirement”). That being said, McChrystal had twice before navigated through career-ending events. 
The first was a cover up of Pat Tillman's death (Stein), and the second the scandal at Abu-Ghraib 
(Hastings, “Runaway General”). Yet despite these, McChrystal navigated the storms and achieved 
promotion through them both. 
 Reasonably speaking, McChrystal from the beginning should have known better than to 
challenge Obama. There was no chance of achieving the reforms he wanted simply by looking at the 
example of Douglas MacArthur. Few military leaders can offer a history close to the astoundingly 
brilliant service of MacArthur. Douglas MacArthur's time as a solider is full of numerous masterful 
victories. He fought in WWI, directed battles in the Pacific, oversaw the conclusion of WWII, and 
reconstructed Japan, to name a few (Rovere 3).  MacArthur was next to God to many of the American 
public in the 1940’s and 50’s, and he knew it. If such a soldier as MacArthur could not get away with 
insubordination, logically none following would either. This however does not mean that McChrystal 
completely rejected MacArthur’s example or was naive to the situation. If nothing else McChrystal 
after his blunder learned from MacArthur by not fighting in commander and chief. MacArthur brought 
his status down by getting into a Constitutional power struggle with the president, which McChrystal 
clearly chose not to do.     
 Was McChrystal insubordinate or simply impolitic? Justifying McChrystal's insubordination 
through comparison to MacArthur is a hard case to prove. There exists a significant difference between 
the men that most critics seem to have passed over. MacArthur on one hand went so far as to threaten 
nuclear deployment against China, while McChrystal believed in a heavily restrained 
counterinsurgency campaign to win over the civilian population (Sanger). McChrystal, even after he 
was removed from command, supported the President's policy. Obama himself made clear that 
  
McChrystal’s actions did not reflect a disagreement in policy. In contrast, MacArthur made his 
differences in policy with Truman well known and used them as a benchmark to rally behind 
politically. McChrystal's insubordination is arguably completely different from that of MacArthur's. As 
“The Afghan Conundrum” says, “This was no MacArthur” (Krauthammer). 
 A more comparable match to McChrystal would be George S. Patton. Patton himself is an ideal 
example of a brilliant military general, who was known for his tactics in the Battle of the Bulge, but 
made painfully rash statements. Print and radio journalist Drew Pearson’s initial report contained 
inaccuracies, but did expose General Patton for slapping a soldier hospitalized for battle fatigue. Patton 
exemplifies a great general whose knowledge in good public relations was lacking. He let his mouth 
run and it got him into trouble (Davidson).  
What happened to McChrystal was less like MacArthur, who was accused of being an 
egotistical warmonger or George Patton, who was painfully naive. Rather, McChrystal falls more in 
line with the lesser known Israeli General Ori Orr. General Orr made “impolitic remarks attributed to 
him by a reporter” and was removed from command based on this publication (Rabinovich). General 
Orr unknowingly made these comments to a reporter who had a hidden agenda whose subsequent 
publication distorted the General’s image so much that he was also removed from command. 
The similarities of his situation differ to that of other generals in U. S. history. Though there 
are strong comparisons with McChrystal to the three previous commanders, McChrystal’s actions stand 
in their own unique place, time, and context.  
 The question persists: How and why did Stanley McChrystal allow a Rolling Stone journalist to 
get close enough for such an article to be published? Was he caught off guard, recklessly brash and 
cocky, naive or deceived? (Davidson) There is no simple or swift conclusion that can be drawn as to 
why McChrystal was insubordinate. However, the media and public seem to have been quick to 
condemn McChrystal's actions as insubordinate. They were remiss in questioning the validity of 
  
Rolling Stone’s article. This approach fails to take into account all of the agents and evidence involved 
when considering McChrystal as a complex person interacting in an elaborately complex environment.  
It can be argued that the lack of unity between McChrystal and the White House had put 
McChrystal in hot water after disparaging comments he made about Vice President Biden in London 
(Burns). One could say the roots of disunity were already there; Rolling Stone, the article, simply 
allowed the root form of disunity to be brought into fruition.  
Frustration is not an uncommon thing in the political world and neither is conflict, which 
Obama himself admitted in his remarks: “All of us have personal interests; all of us have opinions; our 
politics often fuels conflict.” The issue was not over conflict, which is admittedly healthy, but over the 
expression of that conflict in an unhealthy manner and publication of that opinion.  Especially in the 
military “the environment itself requires often honest, quick, and brutal assessments of situations” 
(Carpenter).  
 Beyond the simple political and opinion level of conflict, was there a more powerful form of 
frustration which boiled over leading McChrystal to publish his views in Rolling Stone? After  being 
relieved of command, McChrystal delivered a speech detailing the poor and frustrating roadblocks he 
faced with communication and cooperation in Afghanistan. McChrystal described how an intelligence 
community back in the States withheld information from him and his team on a key enemy leader 
(Mulrine). The environment McChrystal described was fraught with lack of trust and poor 
communication. Some of the frustration, which likely faced the internal members of both the military 
and civilian group, was expressed in a recent New Yorker publication. “What's more, American 
investigators have been ordered not to speak to reporters. Almost without exception, top American 
diplomats will not... 'I'm handcuffed,' an Embassy official told me recently. He held his arms out and 
pushed his wrists together” (Filkins). Perhaps McChrystal was more like MacArthur, who felt bound by 
the restrictions placed on him until he reached a boiling point. Both men did face wars with limited 
  
parameters. 
 With this gag rule in place, another variable to consider which caused frustration is the 
contradictory statements that were coming from McChrystal and the White House. As Jerusalem Post 
noted, “the President of the United States announces the Afghan surge and, in the very next sentence, 
announces the date on which a US withdrawal will begin; the Afghans – from President to peasant – 
take note.” And later, “Vice President Joe Biden is adamant that ‘in July of 2011, you’re going to see a 
whole lot of people moving out. Bet on it” (Krauthammer). These mixed messages regarding the 
United States resolve is precisely what McChrystal noted in the introduction of his “Report on 
Afghanistan”: “there is also a crisis of confidence among Afghans -- in both their government and the 
international community -- that undermines our credibility and emboldens the insurgents. Further, a  
 
perception that our resolve is uncertain makes Afghans reluctant to align with us against the insurgents” 
(McChrystal, “COMISAF” 1-1). 
But was McChrystal’s behavior due to frustration? Was his out-of-line behavior because of an 
inability to handle the environment he was in? If Hastings’ article is completely credible, then yes, this 
would seem to be the case. However, when comparing McChrystal’s own words and actions following 
his resignation, there is a striking difference between the two. In his retirement speech McChrystal  
admitted his frustration, “This is frustrating” (McChrystal, “Retirement”).  However, after this one 
comment, McChrystal did not boil over into an attack against his former superiors. He did not begin a 
lengthy apologia such as MacArthur had in his speech in front of a joint meeting of Congress (Ryan). 
McChrystal did not use his retirement and post-military career to build on an attack against the 
President. The General has been surprisingly silent on the matter and even honoring in his comments 
(McChrystal, Cal Poly). If McChrystal was truly frustrated, then why has he not been more vocal? If he 
was as bothered as critics have claimed, why has he not spoken out? If there are no longer strict limits 
  
on his language, why has he held back? With relatively little left to lose, McChrystal could easily have 
blown up the situation. His silence now does not necessarily validate what his intentions were then. 
McChrystal knew that it was not his place to criticize the Administration policy. 
Without jumping to a conclusion, in consideration of McChrystal’s frustration could Rolling 
Stone have been his means of retiring preemptively? If McChrystal did intended to preemptively retire, 
which is unlikely, wouldn’t there would have been numerous and more effective ways of doing it than 
making back-handed comments in a pop rock magazine? Like MacArthur before him, McChrystal 
could have written letters to senators or made public comments against key cabinet members at 
important moments. It would not have been difficult for McChrystal to use multiple channels to 
publicize his frustration.  
However, would the media and public have responded favorably to a clear criticism by 
McChrystal and rallied behind his cause? The media and public reaction, like that of Truman and 
MacArthur, would most likely have been exactly as it was, supporting Obama's decision to remove his 
General. McChrystal would have known that generals like MacArthur, who had a history of respect for 
civilian authority, and could not get away with it, neither could he. No general is indispensable.  
 Is it possible then that McChrystal’s head was not in the game and he stopped caring? It is 
highly unlikely that McChrystal boiled over so much that he chose to ignore the obvious ramifications 
of speaking out. In his retirement speech, McChrystal's tone was any thing but apathetic or bitter, but 
instead expressed a deeply seeded care and involvement in his mission, “I left unfulfilled commitments 
made to many comrades in the fight, commitments I hold sacred.” And later,  “It is tempting to protect 
yourself from the personal and professional costs of loss by limiting how much you commit, how much 
of belief and trust in people, and how deeply you care. Caution and cynicism are safe, but soldiers don't 
want to follow cautions and cynics. They follow leaders who believe enough to risk failure of 
disappointment for a worthy cause” (McChrystal, “Retirement). McChrystal did not stop caring, 
  
despite the somber tone;  he was consistently very respectful. When asked about his relationship with 
President Obama in a speech delivered at California Polytechnic State University, McChrystal 
described a beneficial and “good” relationship between them. (McChrystal, Cal Poly). Frustration does 
not explain McChrystal’s motives or behavior. 
 If McChrystal was not bursting with frustration, perhaps he was foolish or negligent enough to 
let jesting and crude talk get in the way of proper formality and respect. Arguments offered have 
suggested that his former role in the black ops world killed his chances at later being a visible public 
commander (Boteach). Like Patton before him, McChrystal could be considered an effective military 
practitioner but not adept enough to handle the public forum wisely.  This is unlikely as well,  because 
he had not only survived two previous career-killer controversies, but had moved forward in spite of 
them. He clearly knew enough not to be considered stupid. Even his speech against Biden while in 
London was a weighed move and not done from ignorance (Burns). It was a calculated risk. As stated 
earlier, Stanley McChrystal knew how communication worked and that the source of information 
mattered. McChrystal was so good that he backtracked faulty information channels until the missing 
link was located and remedied. Perception was especially important to McChrystal (Mulrine). 
 McChrystal himself understood the power of metaphors. Like MacArthur, McChrystal is good 
at verbalizing his thoughts. His speech at Cal Poly conveyed the idea of vertigo to help his audience 
understand deeper strategic problems in Afghanistan and misguided good intentions (McChrystal). 
Also, his retirement speech was loaded with clever conclusions and word pictures. Rolling Stone’s 
article and his unwillingness to refute it could explain how well he understood the severity of the 
message and code of honor which he was committed to until his final moments of service. In his 
retirement speech, he expressed regret but not a sense of dishonor or shame, and in a question-answer 
time, he replied by speaking of his respect for the President and how his own actions jeopardized the 
mission. Extreme commitment was conveyed in these two areas. 
  
 McChrystal understood his role as a leading officer and the careful line of conduct he walked. 
“Any commissioned officer who uses contemptuous words against the President, the Vice President, 
Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of a military department, the Secretary of 
Transportation, or the Governor or legislature of any State, Territory, commonwealth, or possession in 
which he is on duty or present shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” (McChrystal and 
Article 88). It is unlikely that McChrystal presumptively retired by using Rolling Stone as his 
mouthpiece or that he was unable to navigate through the complex political environment. 
Acknowledging the mistakes McChrystal might have made and potential motivations as expressed 
rhetorically, what else is left to be considered? 
  McChrystal blundered by granting Rolling Stone reporter Michael Hastings an extended 
interview. But can we consider McChrystal as significantly responsible for consequences arising from 
“The Runaway General” without looking more closely at Michael Hastings? 
Michael Hastings and Muck-Raking 
When considering Michael Hastings’ job as a reporter, grounds for questioning his 
professionalism need to be justified. We most often think of a reporter's job as taking the responsibility 
for breaking important news stories and reporting on abuses in the system. But should a line be drawn? 
What other case is there to be made for and against investigative journalism? What is and is not healthy 
investigative reporting? (Protess).  
 How America understands current investigative journalism started with, “Vietnam improprieties 
….(that) turned public opinion against the war, which led to change in American foreign policy. 
Similarly, news stories that linked top White House officials to Watergate crimes were held responsible 
for the public loss of confidence in the Nixon administration” (Protess 3). Because of this war and 
political scandal, we came to expect reporters to question and reveal on a level previously thought 
disrespectful. Unfortunately, “reporting is often not about finding the best available truth,” but 
  
“uncovering something somebody wants kept secret, whether that is right or wrong” (Protess 5). The 
key to investigative journalism is that, “investigative journalists intend to provoke outrage in their 
reports of malfeasance. Their work is validated when citizens respond by demanding change from their 
leaders” (Protess 5). Hastings’ article did just that; it provoked outrage, but was the change healthy? 
“They (the victims) are representative examples of larger patterns of wrongdoing.” (Protess 9). Did 
Hastings see McChrystal as the “wrongdoer” or see an opportunity for using him as a representative of 
a larger pattern of a broken system? Reporter John Phillips claims, “Hastings did a wonderful job. He 
called out McChrystal as he should have done. That’s his job” (Goodman). But Protess also notes, 
“Occasionally, they (the investigative journalist) may misrepresent their identity to get information, a 
strategy that raises a paradox of its own: is it proper to lie in order to uncover the truth?” (21). What 
truth then was it that Hastings uncovered and did he lie in the intention of writing a provocative article? 
 Hastings bias distorted McChrystal the man. The Rolling Stone's article was portrayed as a 
revelation of the true nature of Afghanistan, but how much of what McChrystal said in it is an honest 
portrayal of him and the situation? Rolling Stone is not an academic journal, and there is no question 
that Michael Hastings’ article is provocative in nature. This journalistic appeal of shock and incendiary 
language is what a reader of Rolling Stone would expect to find. Hastings depicts a brash, arrogant, and 
gun-ho general who has no qualms about challenging his President while at the same time foolhardily 
committing himself to a futile situation in Afghanistan. Stories of McChrystal wreaking havoc at West 
Point, surviving two military scandals with Pat Tillman and Abu Ghraib, his punk attired son with a 
blue mohawk haircut, and the way he took his wife out for fast food on their anniversary are compiled 
to portray McChrystal in a particular light (Hastings, “Runaway General”). This level of in-depth 
knowledge and blunt candor is unusual, especially against someone like McChrystal who is such a 
senior military commander. Hastings’ report does not hold ground when comparing the assertions made 
with professional reports. Hastings summarizes: “After nine years of war, the Taliban simply remains 
  
too strongly entrenched for the US military to openly attack. The very people that COIN seeks to win 
over - the Afghan People – do not want us there. Our supposed ally, President Karzai, used his 
influence to delay the offensive and massive influx of aid championed by McChrystal...” (Hastings, 
“Runaway General” 121).  
Hastings’ claims about the situation in Afghanistan are completely contrary compared with 
Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer and a senior fellow at the Brookings Institute's Saban Center for 
Middle East Policy (Anderson). Bruce asserts: “It is a myth that Afghanistan is an ungovernable space. 
That’s bad history and a misunderstanding of the situation” (Anderson 4). Later Peter Bergen, Co-
director, Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative, New American Foundation, asserted, “68 percent of 
Afghans say they think that the United States is either doing a fair, good, or excellent job” (5).  And 
later, “When asked, would you prefer to be ruled by the current government or the Taliban, 82 percent 
of Afghans say they prefer to be ruled by the current government...63 percent strongly support or 
somewhat support the U.S. Military in Afghanistan” (5,6).  Bergen goes on to make the argument that 
we spent “18 times more per capita in Bosnia and in Kosovo compared to what we did in 
Afghanistan...It is no wonder then why ramping up counter insurgency measures is so highly 
prioritized” (Anderson 5, 6).  
The pictorial presentation is also a powerful message used by Rolling Stone. There are 
excerpts in bold highlighting particular comments that are not only taken out of context, but also fail to 
communicate the complete picture. For example: The General’s team makes jokes about the Vice 
President, whom Obama chose in part for his foreign policy experience. “Biden?” laughs a top aide. 
“Did you say: ‘Bite me?’” Or “McChrystal isn't just in charge on the battlefield: he also calls the 
diplomatic shots” (Hastings, “Runaway General” 92). Inflammatory language like this is used to make 
McChrystal seem almost presidential in power and reckless. Rolling Stone even displays a chart of  the 
“Team of Rivals” which shows eight individuals, four of whom are against McChrystal, and four who 
  
have “sided” with him (Hastings, “Runaway General” 97). The visual interpretation alone infers in-
fighting between McChrystal and the White House. Hastings creates a image of the culture like a 
dogfight over power, “an assortment of administration players compete over the Afghan portfolio” 
 (“Runaway General” 94). 
 Further evidence of Hastings’ abuse of information is with his reporting of the personal time 
that McChrystal and his men spent with their families despite being asked to keep it private (“Rolling 
Stone”). His rendezvous with his wife was specifically asked to be “off the record,” and this was “a 
rare occasion” for the men to be with their families. This personal event was used as evidence against 
the General when it was simply a family get-together. It was private and asked to be kept that way. A 
member of McChrystal's team who was present for a celebration of McChrystal's 33rd wedding 
anniversary at a Paris bar said it was "clearly off the record" (DeYoung). Aides "made it very clear to 
Michael: 'This is private time. These are guys who don't get to see their wives a lot. This is us together. 
If you stay, you have to understand this is off the record' " (DeYoung). 
 Hastings chose to apply “Team America,” an incendiary title, to McChrystal’s culture. When 
asked if “McChrystal's staff jokingly referred to themselves as “Team America,” the Army's response 
was, “not really – we joke that we are sometimes perceived that way by many of the NATO forces” 
(DeYoung). However in the Rolling Stone article, these men are portrayed as being prideful and 
arrogant about such a title, casting it in a macho-militaristic light. “The General’s staff is a handpicked 
collection of killers, spies, geniuses, patriots, political operators, and outright maniacs. There's a former 
head of British Special Forces, two Navy Seals, an Afghan Special Forces commando, a lawyer, two 
fighter pilots, and at least two dozen combat veterans and counter insurgency experts. They jokingly 
refer to themselves as Team America...they pride themselves on their can-do attitude and their disdain 
for authority” (Hastings, “Runaway General” 93). The description leading into the joke makes it sound 
as if they are a group of fraternity boys having a good laugh, joking over how others refer to them and 
  
the power of influence they control. There is a significant difference between talking about how others 
joke about you and taking that title to use it for yourself. 
Even Hastings' metaphorical comparisons were manipulative. Hastings compares 
Afghanistan with Vietnam twice. “In June, Afghanistan officially outpaced Vietnam as the longest war 
in American History.” And also, “...Afghanistan, it’s going to look more like Vietnam than Desert 
Storm” (Hastings, “Runaway General” 93). An extremely inaccurate comparison, when last we 
checked, Vietnam geographically, politically, militarily, and historically was nothing like Afghanistan. 
Bergen asserts: “This will not be Obama's Vietnam; this is a crazy comparison... it's a very different 
conflict. The North Vietnamese Army was a 500,000-man force supported by the Soviets and Mao; it 
was a major problem for the United States. At the height of the violence in Vietnam, 154 American 
solders were being killed every four days. That's the same number that were killed last year in 
Afghanistan. So policy by analogy doesn't work in this case” (Anderson 6). The insurgency in 
Afghanistan is also estimated to be close to 20,000 troops, as compared to 175,000 to 250,000 who 
were fighting the Soviets during their war” (Anderson 6). The comparison between the two does not 
hold up to analysis. In Vietnam the death toll was far more horrific, the civilian population was much 
more united against us and the hostile forces which we face were vastly greater than in Afghanistan. 
Even minute and seemingly irrelevant details were disproportionately inflated. Rolling Stone 
mentions McChrystal's nunchucks, which is a specialized martial arts weapon, and portrays them in a 
machismo way to describe who McChrystal was as a leader. They were, in fact, nothing more than a 
prank pulled on McChrystal by his staff and in no way were taken seriously. “He (McChrystal) does 
not carry them. His protection detail made them for him as a joke as well as a special holder in the 
console of his vehicle. It came from one day M4 was testing his personal staff to make sure they had 
everything before we left for a meeting. ‘My glasses?’ ‘Check sir.’ ‘My Briefing book?’ ‘Check sir.’ 
‘My nunchucks?’ (He was joking to show his staff that they hadn't thought of everything, so they went 
  
out and had a set made for him)” (“Rolling Stone”). However, Rolling Stone described this as follows: 
“He carries a custom-made set of nunchucks in his convoy engraved with his name and four stars” 
(Hastings, “Runaway General” 96). In Rolling Stone the nunchucks are understood to stand for a 
macho-like attitude which is arguably what the audience reader would have understood. Instead they 
symbolize at best the loyalty of a team towards their commander or at the least nothing more than a 
joke (Rolling Stone). 
Rolling Stone’s portrayal of the relationship between Karzai and McChrystal is skewed; 
instead of reflecting an accurate relationship built on trust, Rolling Stone depicted a negative one. 
Rolling Stone's version of Karzai was contrary to McChrystal's own interactions. Rolling Stone states 
that as Karzai was sleeping on the eve of a major offense, McChrystal had to drive over to have him 
sign off on approval. This would be a serious offense if true. Later, Hastings quotes Karzai as being 
uninformed when he said, “General, I didn't even know we were fighting in Uruzgan!” (Hastings,  
“Runaway General” 95). Again, Karzai was portrayed by Rolling Stone as being stubborn and 
uninformed. Yet McChrystal's aide in the thirty-question briefing clarified this because it was not a 
common practice to inform or gain approval from Karzai before McChrystal became commander. 
“Karzai gave it (approval for the mission) but was stunned. Said that in 8 years as President he had 
never once been consulted on a military operation in his own country.” Hastings quotes an aide as 
saying: “He's (Karzai) been locked up in this place the past year,” but Karzai's reclusive nature is 
because “Karzai, following 5-6 assassination attempts, has spent most of his 8 years in office secure 
behind palace walls,” and McChrystal had been active in getting him out (“Rolling Stone”).  
McChrystal “in the past several months” helped Karzai tour the country. Karzai as a “tinpot” leader is 
not an entirely accurate description when all the circumstances are considered (“Rolling Stone”).  
 Publication of McChrystal’s voting record is the most egregious abuse on Rolling Stone's part, 
and is the most explicit signifier of Hastings’ disregard for journalistic honesty and his willingness to 
  
distort or exploit facts to get a story. Pre-publication of “The Runaway General,” McChrystal's aide 
responded to Rolling Stone's editor in capital letters: 
 IMPORTANT - - PLEASE DO NOT INCLUDE THIS (McChrystal’s voting record) - - THIS IS 
 PERSONAL AND PRIVATE INFORMATION  AND UNRELATED TO HIS JOB. IT WOULD BE 
 INAPPROPRIATE TO SHARE. MY REASON FOR THIS AS IT WOULD PRESENT AN  UNDUE 
 COMMAND INFLUENCE ON JUNIOR OFFICERS OF SOLDIERS WHO SHOULD MAKE THEIR 
 OWN POLITICAL DECISIONS. THERE ARE VERY STRICT RULES IN THE MILITARY ON 
 SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE ON THIS SORT OF STUFF – HAVE TO KEEP OUT OF 
 POLITICAL PREFERENCE AND PERSONAL CHOICE. ~ (“Rolling Stone”) 
Hastings subsequently referred to McChrystal’s voting record in print: “Even though he had 
voted for Obama” (92). The question then is this: if McChrystal so clearly did not wish to have 
something as simple as his voting record published, which is in fact the case, why was it published? 
Rolling Stone executive editor, Eric Bates, “said that the remark was ‘absolutely’ not off the record, and 
he noted that Booth's appeal ‘isn't on accuracy or even that it was off the record,’ but that it was 
irrelevant. He said the magazine, like other news organizations, “had no obligation to warn sources that 
they had made unwise remarks” (DeYoung). According to sources involved in the Army investigation 
over McChrystal’s comments, these “unwise remarks” were not said by McChrystal or his top aides 
(Lubold).  
 
McChrystal and Honor 
Military honor is not well understood in mainstream culture. Accused malefactors guilty or 
not, justify themselves through defense and often redirect blame. However, McChrystal seems to have 
reasoned beyond this. His career was fast coming to an end. He seems to understand that a good leaders 
and commanders should be willing to take the responsibility and heat for other’s mistakes. McChrystal 
  
himself may not have made those comments in Rolling Stone nor any of his aides.  Jeopardizing other 
people’s careers and more importantly jeopardizing the mission was not worth the cost to McChrystal. 
McChrystal said so himself: “I offered my resignation to President Obama because the furor created 
over that article I thought put him in a position that was going to make it more difficult to complete the 
mission” (Cal Poly). Lt. Col. Edward T Sholtis, “a U.S. military spokesman in Kabul,” said  "arguing 
about the merits of the article would have seemed like, we were trying to protect or excuse ourselves 
rather than acknowledge our mistake. That may have not been the best PR (public relations) strategy, 
but it was the approach consistent with the character of General McChrystal" (DeYoung). This 
bespeaks his self-confidence and a more dignified acceptance of his resignation. 
His public apology and silence in refusing to refute Rolling Stone has been hastily translated 
into an acknowledgment of guilt. His actions are explained by an understanding of honor and the 
military code of conduct. McChrystal was depicted as rebellious and having a bone to pick against his 
President when McChrystal’s actions since have validated the complete opposite conclusion. He has 
not spoken against his Commander in Chief. Rather, he has been positive in his remarks, “we had a 
good relationship before that; we had a good relationship that day; I still think we have a good 
relationship. And I did what I thought was right, and I’m comfortable with that” (McChrystal, Cal 
Poly). Instead of taking down his Commander, and other men's careers, McChrystal assumed a mistake 
even when it cost him (Hertzberg). McChrystal’s rhetoric during his retirement ceremony and 
subsequent speeches following his resignation express a story with a different sense of honor and 
respect for his former Commander in Chief. Hastings’ story wrongly portrays their relationship and the 
respect McChrystal had for the President. McChrystal's sympathy for the people of Afghanistan is 
completely different from what Rolling Stone claimed it to be. 
Hastings’ report was no Watergate. No great evils were brought into light. Instead a 
destructive bias which deluded the truth, twisted words, and stoked a public uproar was sold. The 
  
President of the United States made a historically important decision based on “The Runaway General” 
which led him to remove his General. Hastings spoke in depth about his reporting style in 2008 in a GQ 
publication where he said “get sources drunk and singing, then report back the behind-the-scenes 
story.” Later Hastings admits more clearly, “If that sounds like I had some trouble being ‘objective,’ I 
did. Objectivity is a fallacy” (Hastings, “Hack”). For the lingering unconvinced critic, Hastings’ agenda 
was not a one-time event. Since gaining glory and winning the Polk award, Hastings has published two 
more stories attempting to indict two more generals (“Michael”). Hastings has gone after General 
Paetreaus, McChrystal’s replacement in Afghanistan, and Lt. Gen. William Caldwell on accusations of 
spying on senators (Hastings “Another Runaway”). Hastings himself has admitted to taking liberties in 
his approach to telling the truth (Bryant). In the most clear way Hastings recounts what he does and his 
goal in journalism. “...your sources of information are the people who work for him. (in this case the 
08’ presidential candidates) So you pretend to be friendly and nonthreatening, and over time you ‘build 
trust,’ which everybody involved knows is an illusion. If the time comes, if your editor calls for it, 
you’re supposed to fuck them over; and they’ll throw you under a bus without much thought, too” 
(Hastings, “Hack”). The likelihood of Michael Hastings being more interested in taking advantage of 
an opportunity to create a story using inflammatory language, and using Stanley McChrystal as a 
deflective scapegoat to sell an anti-war cause is no stretch. In place of healthy investigative journalism, 
which does have its place and is essential in the cases like Watergate and Vietnam to expose corruption 
and wrongdoing, Hastings reporting was anything but healthy. Hastings investigative journalism is 




 “The man with the Muck-rake, the man who could look no way but downward with the  
  
 muck-rake in his hands; who was offered a celestial crown for his muck-rake, but who   
 could neither look up nor regard the crown he was offered, but continued to rake to  
 himself the filth of the floor.” 
 ~ Teddy Roosevelt and The Man with the Muckrake 
 By relieving Stanley McChrystal, the long-lasting implications of McChrystal's resignation and 
Barack Obama's justifications are subtle at the start. Precedence now has been established. No longer 
does relieving a general need to be founded on arguments from policy but now may be justified by a 
circumstantial inflammatory case of muckrake journalism. The lapse in historical understanding of 
precedence was in not allowing a reasonable amount of time to pass for McChrystal's actions to be 
studied and assessed to see if his words were his own. In MacArthur’s case there was no confusing 
what he had done. Truman purposely waited until it was so clearly insubordination that he only had to 
briefly elude to it. Yet with McChrystal, many questions still remained elusive and unanswered. The 
unpublished Army investigation reports suggest that neither McChrystal nor his aides made any of the 
damning comments. Instead, they point to a “mid-level naval officer” (Lubold).  
 It will be seen in greater detail what McChrystal's take on the matter is in his up-and-coming 
memoirs (Bosman). Hastings’ publication “The Runaway General” obfuscated the truth, and Hastings’ 
true colors have since revealed themselves. “Another Runaway General” and “King David’s War” will 
reveal themselves. The implication of these publications and the President’s response will have to be 
seen in time. They open the door for future presidents to relieve their commanders based upon reckless 
comments even though in truth these commanders maintain agreement with their president. Journalism 
has been given too much leeway in reporting without accountability. “The conflict between the military 
and the media will pervade the future just as it has the past. Because the institutions collide at moments 
of such high stress for themselves, and usually danger for their nation, the conflicts seem more abrasive 
than they do in the natural camaraderie of citizens of the same nation under fire on the battlefield” 
  
(Overholser 328). The true danger in this case lies not in insubordination or lack of civilian control over 
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